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THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 1920-1921, IV1

VI.

RETROACTIVE CIVIL LEGISLATION

W

HILE the Constitution does not in terms forbid the United
States, as it forbids the states, to pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts, the principle has become established that contracts made by the United States may create rights of which individuals may not be divested. This principle is attached to the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against depriving any person of
property without due process of law. In applying this principle,
United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. 2 held that a grant of
land to a railroad to induce its construction is a contract, and that
provisions for substituting indemnity lands to supply losses "in the
place limits" confer substantial rights under the protection of the
due-process clause. Government authorities had issued patents for
certain indemnity lands which they later sought to revoke because
before issue the land in question had been withdrawn for the creation of a forest reserve. The company resisted revocation on the
ground that at the time of the withdrawal there was not enough
indemnity land left to make up for the lpsses in the place limits.
The court held that the government cannot defeat its original grant
by withdrawing indemnity lands when there are not enough other
indemnity lands left to enable it to comply with that grant, and that
the general rule that no right attaches to any specific land until it
1s "selected" does not apply as between the government and the
1 For the preceding installments reviewing cases on Miscellaneous National
Powers, Regulation of Commerce, Taxation, Police Power, and Eminent
Domain, see 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I-23, I35-I72, 26I-288 (November and December, I92I; January, I922).
2

256 U. S. 5I, 4I Sup. Ct. 439 (I92I).
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grantee when the lands available for indemnity are not sufficient
for that purpose. There was doubt as to the quantity of indemnity
land remaining at the time of the withdrawal in question, and the
case was sent back for determination of the facts.
In three other cases, parties who relied on contracts with the
federal government to defeat unwelcome action were unable to convince the court that they had the contractual rights asserted. Chase
v. United States3 involved an Indian who claimed a vested right
to select eighty acres of land under an act of 1882 as. against a
later act of 1912 which stood in his way. Mr. Justice McKenna
contented himself with declaring that "the contention is one that
has often been made in this court and rejected as often as made,"
and with citing previous cases. The ground seems to be that the
statute relied on created no rights in individual Indians. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. United States4 a carrier who objected
to a-----. reduction of its compensation for carrying the mails was
reminded that the contract on which it relied was made subject to
all postal laws and regulations which were then or might later
become applicable, and that it was absurd for it to suppose that it
, might, as it did, "discontinue an important item of the services
upon which the compensation was computed, and still demand the
same pay." District of Columbia v. R. P. Andrews Paper Co.'j
allowed the District to charge rent for vaults under the sidewalk,
holding that the original permits were revocable licenses and not
contracts, and that the District is not restricted to the charges and
regulations in force at the time the permit was granted.
The two decisions sustaining rent regulation applied the familiar ·
principle that contracts between private parties are subject to appropriate exercises of the police power and that this liability is a part
of their obligation which -therefore is not impaired when the police
power is exercised. Block v. Hirsh6 sustained the law passed by
Congress for the District of Columbia. The majority opinion said
nothing about -the obligation of contracts, but the minority insisted
that "a contract existing, its obligation is impregnable." In Marcus
a 256
4256
5 256
s256

U. S. 3, 41 Sup. Ct. 417 (1921).
U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 617 (1921).
U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 54S (1921).
U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921), 20 MrcH. L. REv. 274.
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Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,7 which sustained the New York
rent laws, Mr. Justice Holmes for the majority said: "But contracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the state,
when othenvise justified, as we have held this to be." Of the cases
cited in support, Mr. Justice McKenna for the minority observed
that "there is not a line in any of them that declares that the explicit
and definite covenants of private individuals engaged in a privateand personal matter are subject to impairment' by a state law."
The proper meaning of this is that the rent laws are not proper
exercises of the police power, since 'they deal with purely private
matters. Mr. Justice McKenna himself in sustaining a law requiring employers to substitute contributions in a state fund for private
insurance, in Thornton v. Ditffy8 declared that "an exercise of
public policy cannot be resisted because of conduct or contracts
done or made upon the faith of former exercises of it upon the
ground that its later exercises deprive of property or invalidate
those contracts." He also wrote the opinion in Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co.,O which passed over in silence the objection that a statute·
forbidding the use of natural gas for making carbon black impaired
previous contracts for the sale of carbon black. In Erie Railroad
Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,1° which compelled
construction of underpasses to remove grade crossings, Mr. Justice
Holmes remarked that "contracts made by the road are made subject to the possible exercise of the sovereign right."
.These cases might lead to the inference that past contracts never
may stand in the way of the application of state police measures;
but we know that one of the earliest decisions on the obligationof-contracts clause prohibited a state from applying a bankruptcy
law to debts created prior to its enactment. This decision is one
of the authorities relied on by Mr. Justice McReynolds in Bank of
Minden v. Clenient11 for the conclusion that the exemption laws of
7256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (I921). 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 278. In 5 MINN.
L. R.Ev. 474 this case is considered from the standpoint of the obligation-ofcontracts clause.
8 254 U.S. 361, 4I Sup. Ct. 137 (1920), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 267.
9 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. n8 (I920), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 26x.
10 254 U. S. 394. 4I Sup. Ct. I6g ( I921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 283.
11256 U.S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 408 (192I). See 2I Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 5g8, and
8 VA. L. R.Ev. 58.
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a state cannot deprive creditors of assets to which they were entitled
under the law at the time the indebtedness arose. A Louisiana law
of r9r4 provided that insurance policies payable to the estate of the
assured shall be exempt from attachment for his debts. Before
this the late Mr. Clement had borrowed money and had taken out
insurance payable to his estate. Under the law then applicable the
policies payable to his estate became his property subject to the
claims of his creditors. Without any analysis of the problem other
than that to be inferred from citation of decisions and quotation
from opinions, Mr. Justice McReynolds declares that "so far as
the statute of r9r4 undertook to exempt the policies and their proceeds from antecedent debts it came into conflict with the federal
Constitution." Mr. Justice Clarke dissented.12
In two cases complainants were unable to establish the contracts
relied on to defeat police measures. The much-litigated Detroit
street railroad controversy came before the court again in Detroit
United Ry. v. Detroit.13 It previously had been decided that the
original franchise of the road had expired, but the company claimed
contractual rights in ordinances permitting it to continue to do
business. These ordinances expressly declared that the permits
granted might be revoked and that action under the so-called dayto-day agreement should not waive the rights of the city or of the
company. A decree in the state court fixing the terms of temporary
operation stated that it should not affect the fundamental .rights of
12 For discussions of various phases of the problem of retroactive civil
legislation, see Nathan Isaacs, "John Marshall on Contracts: A Study in
Early American Juristic Theory," 7 VA. L. Rev. 4I3; C. Brewster Rhoads,
"The Police Power as a Limitation upon the Contractual Right of Public
Service Corporations," 69 U. PA. L. R1"v. 3I7; William Trickett, "Is a Grant
a Contract?" 54 AM. L. Rev. 7I8, 25 DICKINSON L. Rev. 3I; E. J. Verlie,
"Retrospective Legislation in Illinois," 3 ILL. L. BULL. 28; and notes in I9
MICH. L. R1"v. 112, 547, on the power of the state to raise rates fixed by
contract between a city and the carrier; in 6 CoRN1"LL L. Q. 432, I9 MICH. L.
Rev. 866, and 30 YAL~ L. J. 862, 869, on the constitutionality of statutes permitting arbitration when agreed upon in a contract; in 34 HARV. L. Rev. on
validating unauthorized collection of canal tolls; and in 30 YALE L. J. 759 on
whether a vested right is created by a statute permitting the condemnee of
land to repurchase after the abandonment of the public use for which it was
taken.
13 255 U. S. I7I, 4I Sup. Ct. 285 (I921), 20 M1cH. L. Rev. 285.
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the parties. These stipulations were found sufficient to defeat the
claim that the company had a contractual right to continue. A
claim of estoppel was negatived because, at the time of the acts of
the city relied on to create the estoppel, .the state constitution forbade the grant of an irrevocable franchise except upon the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the electors, which vote had not been
taken. Therefore the company might be ordered to remove its
tracks and there was no impediment in the the way of the city's proceeding to construct or acquire tracks for a municipal road.
The statute involved in International Bridge Co. v. New York 14
required the construction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway
for pedestrians on a railroad bridge of a company whose original
charter permitted but did not command such accommodations. The
change from permission to compulsion was held to be justified by
the reserved power to amend the charter. It appeared also that
an intervening statute permitting the consolidation of two bridge
companies subjected the new corporation to all the duties of each
of the consolidated companies. One of these companies had a Canadian charter which required the construction of a roadway and
pathway. To the contention that this requirement was confined to
the Canadian part of the bridge, Mr. Justice Holmes replied that
"it would be quibbling with the rational understanding of the duty
assumed to say that the company could have supposed that it had
a contract or property right to confine its building of the foot-path
and carriage-way to the Canadian side of the boundary line." A
question as to the amount of the fees authorized to be charged for
these new accommodations was put to one side as not connected
with the issue whether the accommodations might be required, since
the fees might be raised if at any time they proved too low.
It is familiar that legislative exemptions from taxation may be
contracts which the state may not later impair, but that the courts
lean strongly against finding a contract. This strong leaning finds
illustration in Troy Union R.R. Co. v. Mealy. 15 In 1852, a city and
14 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 56 ( 1920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 140,i 285. Chief
Justice White and Justices McKama and McReynolds dissented, but did not
indicate their objections.
iG 254 U. S. 47, 41 Sup. Ct. 17 (1920).
See 34 HARV. L. Riw. 541, 553,
19 MICH. L. REv. 438, and 30 YALE L. J. 427.
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four railroads formed a corporation to erect a union station under
a contract in which the city covenanted to try to get the legislature
to limit the assessment of the station to $30,000, the capital of the
corporation, and in case the legislature did not do so, to refund
city taxes on any amount exceeding $30,000. In 1853 the legislature passed a statute providing that the property of the corporation
should be assessed at the amount of the capital stock of the company, and no more. In 1886 and 1887 the city sought to assess the
station for more than twenty times the agreed $30,000, but it was
held by the 5tate court that it could not do so. In 1909, however,
the act of 1853 was repealed and the city thereafter tried again to
escape the $30,000 limit. The case as it came 1.o the Supreme Court
involved only the question whether the statute of 1853 was a contract. As to that, Mr. Justice Holmes declared :
"The Court of Appeals held that the concession in the act
of 1853 was spontaneous and belonged to the class of privilegia favorabilia, * * * and therefore was subject to repeal.
This is a question upon which we should be slow to differ
with a decision of the New York courts with regard to a
New York corporation. It may be that too much stress was
laid upon the absence of a consideration for the exemption,
* * * and that a fairly strong argument could be made for
interpreting the grant of 1853 as purporting to be co-extensive with the contract recited in that grant, whether correctly
recited or not. * * * But taking into consideration the general
attitude of the courts toward claims of exemption, adverted
to by the Court of Appeals, the fact that the agreement of
1858 shows that the parties concerned did not suppose that
they had an ir_revocable grant, and especially the fact that
the constitution of New York in force in 1853 provided in
Article VIII, Section l, that all general laws and special acts
passed pursuant to that section might be altered or repealed,
we are not prepared to say that the decision below was
wrong."
The agreement of 1858 to which Mr. Justice Holmes refers was ,
one in which foreclosure proceedings brought by the city were
dropped and the city agreed that if the act of 1853 should be repealed
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it would join in an application to the legislature to renew the exemption, and again covenanted that if the desired law was not passed
it would refund city taxes in excess of $30,000, as before. Whether
the city could be made liable for a refund on this agreement was
not passed upon in the court below and so was not considered by
the Supreme Court.
Sometimes it is the state which relies on contracts entered into
by individuals or corporations in order to defeat objections to
requirements which the state later imposes. · It is well established
that charter provisions with regard to the fares to be charged by
railroads may be contracts binding on both parties so that the company may defeat attempts to lower the fares or the state may insist
that the fares fixed in the contract must continue even though they
become so unremunerative that they could not be imposed as an
exercise of the police power. In two cases in which rates previously fixed by cities had become confiscatory with the rise in cost
of operations the cities contended unsuccessfully that the rates had
been fixed by contract and that therefore the companies continued
to be bound by them. In Soiqtltern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton1e
Chief Justice White stated the applicable principles as. follows :
"Two propositions are indisputable: (a) That although
the governmental agencies having authority to deal with the
subject may fix and enforce reasonable rates to be paid public
utility corporations for the services by them rendered, that
power does not include the right to fix rates which are so
low as to be confiscatory of the property of such corporations '~ * ':'; and (b) that where, however, the public service
corporations and the governmental agencies dealing with
them have power to contract as to rates to govern during a
particular time, the enforcement of such rates is controlled
by the obligation resulting from the contract, and therefore
the question of whether such rates are confiscatory becomes
immaterial."
The city here relied on a provision in the franchise ordinance which
limited the fares to be charged. The decision that this limitation
16

MICH.

255 U. S. 539, 41 Sup. Ct. 400 (1921), 20 M1cH. L. Riw. 28I. See I9
L. Riw. 886, and 20 MICH. L. ~v. 224.
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was not contractual in nature but merely an exercise of legislative
power was based on a line of Iowa decisions. holding that the legislature had withheld from cities the power to contract. One of these
cases was squarely in point, as it had allowed a company to raise
rates above the limit fixed in the ordinance granting its franchise.
Tlie issue in San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co. 11
was more complicated. In 1899, when the company acquired its
franchise under an ordinance fixing a five-cent fare, the Texas
constitution provided. that "no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant
of special privileges or immunities shall be made, but all privileges
and franchises granted by the legislature or created under its
authority shall be subject to the control thereof." The Texas court
had held that this left the legislature free to require half-fares for
school children, notwithstanding a franchise prescription of a fivecent fare. Chief Justice White assumes that what is not sauce for
the company is not sauce for the city and that if the hands of the
state are not tied the hands of the roads are also free from any
contract obligation. The contention to the contrary is disposed of
as follows:
"And this is true, also, of the suggestion, made in argument, that, although no contract was possible under the constitutional restriction which would bind the city not to lower
the rate, nevertheless there was a unilateral contract or condition, resulting from the granting of the franchise, which
bound the railway company to the franchise rate, since again
there is not the slightest suggestion of any attempt on the
part of the parties to produce such a condition. But, besides,
the error underlying the proposition is not far to seek. The
duty of an owner of private property used , for the public
service to charge only a reasonable rate, and thus respect the
authority of government to regulate in the public interest,
and of government to regulate by fixing such a reasonable
rate as will safeguard the rights of private ownership, are
interdependent and reciprocal. Where, however, the right
to contract exists, and the parties, the public on the one hand
and the private on the other, do so contract, the law of the
11255 U. S. 547, 4I Sup. Ct. 428 (r92r), 20 MICH. L. Riw. 28r. See 20
MICH. L. Rev. 224-
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contract governs both the duty of the private owner and the
governmental power to regulate. Where, therefore, as in
the case supposed in the argument, the -regulating power of
government being wholly uncontrolled by contract, it would
follow that that power would be required to be exerted and
hence the supposed condition operating upon the private
owner would be nugatory. Such a case really presents no
question of a condition, since it resolves itself into a mere
issue of the exercise by the government of its regulatory
power."
It appeared further that after 1912, the city had power to contract
and that in consenting to a consolidation of companies into the
complainant company the city stipulated that the new concern
should be subject to the limitations, duti~s, and obligations which
rested on the original companies. This was held not to convert the
original fare limitation into a contract. It is worthy of note that
the case originated in the federal court and that the decision professes to be based on the law of the state as laid down by the state
court. The Texas court had never held that the companies were
not bound by the terms of their franchises, but only that the state
was not bound. The former does not necessarily follow from the
latter. It is quite possible that state courts will hold that franchise
provisions are contractual conditions on the rights of the recipient
though not on the power of the grantor; i. e., that the permission
granted to the railroad is limited to the designated fare even though
neither the city nor the legislature could bind itself not to exercise
its regulatory power to reduce the fare. If this happens we shall
have a different situation from that presented in the San Antonio
case. The Supreme Court may then follow the state court on a
matter of state law, or it may hold the state decision erroneous,
as it frequently does when it thinks that state courts have in effect
allowed the impairment of the obligation of contracts by unwarrantably holding that no contract existed or that its provisions do
not preclude the legislation complained of. The Supreme Court·
would be likely to follo:w a long line of state decisions that cities
had power to contract and had contracted, but to look askance at
a new decision which it thought the complainant was not reasonably
bound to anticipate.
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VII.

IMMUNITIES OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME

r. Searches and Seizures
Though the Fourth Amendment declares that the right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, it provides for no machinery for enforcing the guaranty. The methods of enforcement worked out by the courts
include the granting of petitions for the return of papers and effects
wrongfully taken and the exclusion of such papers from use as evidence against their rightful possessor. The second form of protection is based in part on the so-called-privilege against self-incrimination conferred by the declaration of the Fifth Amendment that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. Apparently also the granting of petitions for the
return of papers is sometimes based on the Fifth as well as on the
Fourth Amendment. The two amendments are so joined in the
opinions of the past term that cases based on both are not securely
to be taken as interpretations of either alone. The separation here
indulged in may therefore be open to suspicion, but it is nevertheless ventured in the hope that it may perhaps be serviceable and that
this warning to the reader will put him on his guard against being
misled.
Biirdeait v. M cDowell18 involved a petition asking for an order
to a prosecuting attorney to return certain papers which had been
stolen from the petitioner by agents of his employer and by them
turned over to the government to be used in proceedings before the
grand jury. In justifying the denial of the petition Mr. Justice Day
declared:
"The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases,
its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies ; as
against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
l!\256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921). See 22 Cor.uM. L. Riw. 77, 35
HARV. L. Riw. 84 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 353, 6 MINN. L. R.Ev. 70, 7 VA. L. REG.
n. s. 288, and 31 YAI.E L. J. 335.
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occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued.
In the present case the record clearly shows that no official
of the federal government had anything to do with the
wrongful seizure of the petitioner's property, or any knowledge thereof until several months after the property had
been taken from him and was in the possession of the Cities
Service Company. It is manifest that there was no invasion
of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizure, as whatever was done was
the act of individuals in taking the property of another. A
portion of the property so taken and held was turned over
to the prosecuting officers of the federal government. We
assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress
against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private
property under the circumstances here disclosed, but with
such remedies we are not now concerned."
A dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred in by Mr.
Justice Holmes, thought that such irregular acquisition ought not
to make the government's possession of the papers rightful even
though no provision of the Constitution requires their surrender.
Among the papers involved in Gouled v. United States19 was one
that had been stolen from the accused by agents of the Intelligence
Department of the United States Army and by them turned over
to a federal prosecuting officer and used against the defendant at
his trial. In holding that this taking was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment Mr. Justice Clarke observed:
"The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment is against
unreasonable searches and seizures and if for a government
officer to obtain entrance to a man's house or office by force
or by an illegal threat or show of force, amounting to coercion, and then to search . for and seize his private papers
would be an unreasonable search and seizure, as it certainly
would be, it is impossible to successfully contend that a like
search and seizure would be a reasonable one if only admission· were obtained by stealth instead of by force and coer10 255 U. S. 2g8, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921). See 5 MINN. L. REv. 465, and
30 YAr.t L. J. 769.
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cion. The security and privacy of the home or office and of
the papers of the owner would be as much invaded and the
search and seizure would be as much against his will in the
one case as in the other, and it must therefore be regarded
as equally in violation of his constitutional rights.
Without discussing them, we cannot doubt that such decisions as there are in conflict with this conclusion are unsound,
and that, whether entrance to the home or office of a person
suspected of crime be obtained by a representative of any
branch or subdivision of the government of the United
States by stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the
guise of a business call, and whether the owner be present
or not when he enters, any search and seizure subsequently
and secretly made in his absence, falls within the scope of
the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment."
The other papers involved in the case had been taken under search
warrants accompanied by affidavits which, so far as appeared, sufficiently described the papers to be seized. The question whether
the seizure was reasonable was said to depend upon whether the
papers were wanted merely as aids in securing the conviction of
the accused or because their retention by their possessor was in
itself unlawful or was an aid in his nefarious enterprise. This contrast was set forth by Mr. Justice Clarke as follows:
"The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that
search warrants were in familiar use when the Constitution
was adopted and, plainly, that when issued 'upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the places to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized,' searches, and seizures made under them, are to
be regarded as not unreasonable, and therefore not prohibited by the amendment. Searches and seizures are as constitutional under the amendment when made under valid
search warrants as they are unconstitutional, because unreasonable, when made without them-the permission of the
amendment has the same constitutional warrant as the prohibition has, and the definition of the former restrains the
scope of the latter. All this is abundantly recognized in the
opinions of the Boyd and Weeks Cases, supra, in which it is
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pointed out that at the time the Constitution was adopted
stolen or forfeited property, or property liable to duties and
concealed to avoid payment of them, excisable articles and
books required by law to be kept with respect to them, counterfeit coin, burglars' tools and weapons, implements of gambling 'and many other things of like character' might be
searched for in home or office and if found might be seized
under search warrants, lawfully applied for, issued and executed.
Although search warrants have thus ·been used in many
cases ever since the adoption of the Constitution, and although
their use has been extended from time to time to meet new
cases within the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at
common law and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases,
sitpra, they may not be used as a means of gaining access to
a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of
making search to secure evidence to be used against him in
criminal or penal proceedings, but that they may be resorted
to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may
be found in the interest which the public or the complainant
may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful
and provides that it may be taken."
As the certificate of the circuit court of appeals failed to show that
the government had any interest in the seized papers other than as
evidence against the accused, the seizure was held unlawful and the
use of the paper as evidence after due objection was held a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The property involved in Amos v. United States 20 was whiskey
taken without any warrant by revenue officers from the home of
the defendant in his absence. His wife was present and made no
resistance to the search, but the court found "implied coercion" on
the part of the officers and declared that it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the constitutional immunity of the husband
might be waived by his wife. The conviction was set aside because
20

255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921). See 5 MINN. L. Rsv. 465.
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of the wrongful refusals of the trial judge to exclude the whiskey
as evidence and to strike out the testimony of the revenue officers
as to their search and its results. The questions as to the introduction of the evidence in this case and in the Gou..Zed Case will be considered more in detail in the paragraphs dealing with the privilege
against self-incrimination.21
2.

Self Incrimination

It is now established that the privilege against self-incrimination
includes immunity from the use against an ~ccused of papers taken
from hi~ by an unconstitutional search and seizure. There has in
the past been some uncertainty as to what steps must be taken on
behalf of the accused to enable him to take advantage of this
immunity. Some cases have seemed to indicate that a petition
before trial for the return of the papers is a necessary prerequisite
to an objection to their introduction in evidence. This requirement
is somewhat relaxed by the decisions handed down at the last term
of court. In Gouled v: United States2 2 one of the papers introduced
in evidence had been stolen from the defendant by a government
agent. The accused was ignorant of the theft and so could not
petition for its return before trial. In answering the question certified by the circuit court of appeals whether the taking of the
paper was a wrongful search and seizure, Mr. Justice Clarke
assumed that one of the grounds on which the trial court overruled
an objection to the introduction of the paper in evidence against
the accused was that his objection came too late. To this he
answered that "the objection was not too late, for, coming as it did
promptly upon the first notice the defendant had that the government was in possession of the paper, the rule of practice relied upon,
that such an objection will not be entertained unless made before
trial, was obviously inapplicable." It must be regarded by the court
as equally inapplicable to the issue whether the accused was in a
21 The use of evidence obtained by wrongful search and seizure is considered in Osmond K. Frankel, "Concerning Searches and Seizures," 34
HARV. L. RJW. 361 ; and notes in 15 ILL. L. RJW. 393, 19 MICH. L. REv. 355,
and 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 850. In 21 CoLUM. L. RJW. 291 is a note on a case
holding that contraband property need not be returned even after seizure
under an insufficient warrant.
22 Note 19, supra.
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position to daim immunity from the use of the paper under the
Fifth Amendment, since immunity under that amendment was
affirmed in the decision. On this point Mr. Justice Clarke said:
"In pra~tice the result is the same to one accused of crime,
whether he be obliged to supply evidence against himself or
whether such evidence be obtained by an illegal search of
his premises and seizure of his private papers. In either
case he is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the Fifth
Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case."
Other papers in the case were seized under a search warrant held
invalid because issued primarily to obtain evidence against the
accused. The introduction of these papers in evidence was held an
infringement of the immunity against self-incrimination. A petition for return of the papers had been filed before trial and denied.
In holding that the trial court should upon objection to the introduction of the evidence consider anew whether the papers had
rightfully come into the possession of the government Mr. Justice
Clarke said:
"The papers being of 'evidential value only' and having
been unlawfully seized, this question really is whether, it
having been decided on a motion before trial that they should
not be returned to the defendant, the trial court, when objection was made to their use on the trial, was bound to again
inquire as to the unconstitutional origin of the possession of
them. It is plain that the trial court acted upon the rule,
widely adopted, that courts in criminal trials will not pause
to determine how the possession of the evidence has been
obtained. While this is a rule of great practical importance,
yet, after all, it is only a rule of procedure and therefore it
is not to be applied as a hard and 'fast formula to every case,
regardless of its special circumstances. We think rather that
it is a rule to be used to secure the ends of justice under the
circumstances presented by each case, and where, in the progress of a trial, it becomes probable that there has been an
unconstitutional seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial
court to entertain an objection to their admission or a motion
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for their exclusion and to consider and decide the question
as then presented, even where a motion to return the papers
may have been denied before trial. A rule of practice must
not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a
constitutional right.
In the case we are considering the certificate shows that
a motion to return the papers,, seized under the search warrants, was made before the trial and was denied, and that on
the trial of the case before another judge, this ruling was
treated as conclusive, although, as we have seen, in the progress of the trial it must have become apparent that the papers
had been unconstitutionally seized. The constitutional objection having been renewed, under the circumstances, the court
should have inquired as to the origin of the possession of the
papers when they were offered in evidence against the defendant."
On its facts this case holds no more than that a petition before trial
for return of papers is not a prerequisite to an objection to their
introduction in evidence if knowledge of the government's wrongful
possession is first acquired when the papers are offered in evidence,
and that the wrongful denial of a petition before trial for return
of papers does not conclude the issue and relieve the trial court of·
inquiring whether the papers offered in evidence were rightly
obtained. Some of Mr. Justice Clarke's language, however, goes
further and implies, if it does not definitely state, that the trial
court must consider an objection to the use of the papers in evidence
whenever it is probable they were obtained by an unconstitutional
search or seizure, thus dispensing with any prerequisite of petition
before trial.
That the Gouled case is understood by the court to go further
than the facts required it to go seems evident from the reliance on
it in Amos v. u~iited Sta.tes,2 3 decided on the same day, in which
Mr. Justice.Clarke again wrote the opinion. Here the defendant's
wife knew of the wrongful seizure by government officers at the
time when it was made. There is no indication that the defendant
was surprised by their testimony that they found the whiskey; his
23

Note

20,

supra.
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advance knowledge that they had it is apparent from the fact that
after the jury was impaneled and before it was introduced in evidence he moved to have it returned to him. This motion was denied
by the trial court, as was also a motion to strike out the testimony
of the officers and to exclude the use of the whiskey as evidence.
In holding these denials wrongful, Mr. Justice Clarke said:
"The answer of the government to the claim that the trial
court erred in the two rulings we have described is that the
petition for the return of defendant's property was properly
denied, be.cause it came too late when presented after the
jury was impaneled and the trial, to that extent, commenced,
and that the denial of the motion to exclude the property and
the testimony of the government agents relating thereto,
after the manner of the search of the defendant's home had
been described, was justified by the rule that in the progress
of the trial of criminal cases courts will not stop to frame a
collateral issue to inquire whether evidence offered, othenvise
competent, was lawfully or unlawfully obtained. Plainly
.questions thus presented for decision are ruled by the conclusions this day announced in Feli:c Gouled v. United States."
Thus the requirement of petition before trial has evaporated even
when the facts necessary to make such a petition are known to the
defendant. The Amos case plainly is unwarranted by the actual
decision in the Gouled case. It goes beyond that case in requiring
an objection to the introduction of evidence to be entertained.
although a motion for return has not been filed until after the trial
has technically begun. The "conclusions announced" in the Goided
case are broad enough to dispense with any preliminary motion for
return of the papers, and such broad conclusions seem to be the
basis of the decision in the Amos case. Technically, however, it is
still possible for the court to hold that some preliminary foundation
must still be laid for an objection to the introduction of evidence
wrongfully obtained. On its facts the Amos case goes no further
than that a motion for return of papers is seasonable if made before
the introduction of any evidence in the case.
Another of the questions certified to the Supreme Court in the
Gouled case assumed that the evidence was rightly obtained for a
valid purpose under a valid warrant and inquired whether such
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papers could be used in evidence against their owner when on trial
for a different offense than that with which he was charged when
the seizure was made. To this Mr. Justice Clarke replied:
"It has never been required that a criminal prosecution
should be pending against a person in order to justify search
for and seizure of his property under a proper warrant, if a
case of crime having been committed and of probable cause
is made out sufficient to satisfy the law and the officer having
authority to issue it, and we see no reason why property
seized under a valid search warrant, when thus lawfully
obtained by the government, may not be used in the prosecution of a suspected person for a crime other than that
which may have been described in the affidavit as having been
committed by him. The question assumes that the property
seized was obtained on a search warrant sufficient in form to
satisfy the law, and if the papers to which the question relates
had been of a character to be thus obtained, lawfully, it would
have been competent to use them to prove any crime against
the accused to which they constituted relevant evidence."

As we have seen, Burdeait v. M cDowell24 holds that the government may rightfully acquire papers by gift from a thief, so far as
the prohibition against searches and seizures is concerned. The
case also holds that papers so acquired may be used against their
owner in proceedings before the_ grand jury without violating the
privilege against self-incrimination. On this point Mr. Justice Day
says:
"The Fifth Amendment, as its terms import is intended to
secure the citizen from compulsory testimony against himself.
It protects from e,"'Ctorted confessions, or examinations in
court proceedings "by compulsory methods.
The exact question to be decided here is : May the government retain incriminating papers, coming to it in the manner
described, with a view to their use in a subsequent investigation by a grand jury where such papers will be part of the
evidence against the accused, and may be used against him
upon the trial should an indictment be returned?
Note 18, supra.
0

24
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We know of no constitutional principle which requires the
government to surrender the papers under such circumstances.
Had it learned that such incriminatory papers, tending to
show a violation of federal law, were in the hands of a person other than the accused, it having had no part in wrongfully obtaining them, we know of no reason why a subpoena
might not issue for the production of the papers as evidence.
Such production would require no unreasonable search or
seizure, nor would it amount to compelling the accused to
testify against himself.
The papers having come into the possession of the government without a violation of petitioner's rights by governmental authority, we see no reason why the fact that individuals, unconnected with the government, may have wrongfully taken them, should prevent them for being held for use •
in prosecuting an offense where the documents are of an
incriminatory character.

In dissenting Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"That the court would restore the papers to plaintiff if
they were still in the thief's possession is not questioned.
That it has power to control the disposition of these stolen
papers, although they have passed into the possession of the
law officer, is also not questioned. But it is said that no provision of the Constitution requires their surrender and that
the papers could have been subpoenaed. This may be true.
Still I cannot believe that action of a public official is necessarily lawful because it does not violate constitutional prohibitions and because the same result might have been attained
by other and proper means. At the foundation of our civil
liberty lies the principle which denies to government officials
an exceptional position before the law and which subjects
them to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. And in the development of our liberty insistence
upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. Respect
for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to
means which shock the common man's sense of decency and
fair play."
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Mr. Justice Holmes joined in this dissent.
The question in Arndstein v. McCan.th~s was whether the filing
of schedules by a bankrupt in involuntary proceedings constitutes a
waiver of his privilege against self incrimination with respect to
questions with regard to them in bankruptcy proceedings when a
statute provides that his answers to such questions may not be used
against him in criminal proceedings. A negative answer is supported by Mr. Justice McReynolds as follows :
"The schedules, standing alone, did not amount to an
admission of guilt or furnish clear proof of crime, and the
mere filing of them did not constitute a waiver of the right
to stop short whenever the bankrupt could fairly claim that
to answer might tend to incriminate hi.m. * * * It is impossible to say from mere consideration of the questions propounded, in the light of the circumstances disclosed, that
they could have been answered with entire impunity. * * *
'No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against ~imself.' Fifth Amendment. 'This
provision must have a broad construction in favor of the
right which it was intended to secure.' 'The object was to
secure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as
a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.'
The protection of the Constitution was not removed by
the provision in section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act: 'No testimony given by him shall ·be offered in evidence against him
in any criminal proceeding.' 'It could not and would not
prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony
to be used in evidence against him or his property.' " 26
25 254 U. S. 71, 41 Sup. Ct. 26 (1920). Mr. Justice Day did not sit. Mr.
Rufus R. Day was of counsel for Mr. Arndstein.
2 6 The privilege against self-incrimination is considered in Ernest
Bruncken, "Making the Accused Testify Against Himself," 5 MARQU~~
L. fuv. 82; and a note in 5 MINN. L. fuv. 475 on a, case holding that an
assured may be compelled to submit to examination as to the cause of a
fire when he has made an agreement to that effect in his contract of insurance.
Constitutional provisions prescribing the place of trial are considered in
5 MINN. L. R~. 148, 6g U. PA. L. fuv. 361, and 7 VtA. L. fuv. 313; arrest
without warrant, in 15 ILL. L. fuv. 464; denial of public trial by excluding
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3. Substantive Elements in Crime Charged
(a) Freedom of Speech. A certain Mr. Gilbert told a Minnesota
audience that they had had nothing to say about who should be
president or governor or whether America should go into the war
against Germany and that "we were stampeded into this war by
newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her."
For this he was convicted of violating a section of the Minnesota
statute forbidding teaching or advocacy that the citizens of the state
should not aid the United States in prosecuting a war against its
enemies. In Gilbert v. MinnesotaP this conviction was held not to
be an infringement of the right of free speech. Mr. Justice McKenna
points out that, at the time the offending speech was made, the war
was flagrant and armies were enlisti~g and that the purpose -of the
speech was necessarily the discouragement of such enlistment. Thus
indirectly he seems to answer the contention of Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion that the state statute applied to times of
peace as well as of war and that the section under which the indictment was brought was so broad as to apply to fathers and mothers
who in the privacy of their homes urged their sons not to enlist.
The majority do not pass on the question whether the Fourteenth
:Amendment restricts the states as the First Amendment restricts
the United States, since they approve of the conviction under the
state statute on the basis of decisions sustaining convictions under
the federal espionage laws. Mr. Justice McKenna quoted with
approval his own comments in an earlier opinion that "the curious
public; including relatives of accused, in trial for statutory rape, in 5 MINN.
L. Rlw. 554; a case holding that the right to assistance of counsel does not
include privilege of discharging counsel and so of addressing the jury personally, in 5 MINN. L. Rlw. 553; waiver of privilege of confrontation of jury,
in 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 439.
Discussions of double jeopardy may be grouped as follows: appeal by
state in criminal cases, in 19 MICH. L. Rtv. 79; previous conviction on void
indictment, in 20 Car.UM. L. Rlw. 915, 69 U. PA. L. Rlw. 17I, and 30 YAI.£
L. J. 864; acquittal of murder as bar to indictment for involuntary manslaughter, in 69
p A. L. Rlw. 278; offenses against state and federal liquor
laws, in 34 HARV. L. Rlw. 785 and 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 647; offenses against both
state and city, in 7 VA. L. Riw. 636.
2 1254 U.S. 325, 4I Sup. Ct. 125 (I920), 20 MICH. L. Rtv. 10, 265.
See
2I Car.UM. L. Rtv. 483, 15 kr.. L. Rlw. 530, 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 870, and 30
YAU~ L. J. 623.
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spectacle was presented of the Constitution of the United States
·being invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies
of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its precepts it
was adduced against itself," and he declared that every word that
Mr. Gilbert "uttered in denunciation of the war was false, was a
deliberate misrepresentation of the motives which impelled it, and
the objects for which it was prosecuted," and that Mr. Gilbert knew
that the war "was not declared in aggression, but in defense, in
defense of our national honor, in vindication of the 'most sacred
rights of our nation and our people.' " 28
(b) Indefiniteness of criminal statute. In a series of cases the
so-called Lever Act by which Congress undertook as a war measure
to regulate the prices of necessaries was declared unconstitutional
for its failure sufficiently to specify any standard for determining
whether the prices exacted were "excessive." Mr. Justice Pitney,
with whom Mr. Justice Brandeis agreed, urged that the statute forbade only a conspiracy to exact excessive prices for necessaries and
that the isolated acts of individuals could not be punished under this
prohibition against conspiracy. He contended also that another
section declaring it unlawful to make any unjust or unreasonable
rate or: charges in the handling of necessaries is confined to charges
for services and does not embrace the price for the sale of the goods,
The majority found the words "broad enough to embrace the price
at which a commodity is sold," but held that the words "unjust,"
"unreasonable" and "excessive" are so vague as to fail to inform
persons accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them within the prescription of the Sixth Amendment. The leading
case was United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 29 in which Chief
28 Discussions of freedom of speech appear in Edward S. Corwin, "Freedom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment,'' 30 ·YALE L. J. 4S;
Herbert F. Goodrich, "Does the Constitution Protect Free Speech?" 19 MICH.
L. REv. 4S7; James Parker Hall, "Free Speech in War Time," 21 Cox.mt.
L. REv. 526; W. A. S., "Prosecutions under the Espionage Act and Lessons
Therefrom," 24 LAW NOTES 165; and notes in 16 Iu. L. REv. 64 and 30 YALE
L. J. 68, 861.
29 255 U. S. Sr, 4r Sup. Ct. 29S (I92I), 20 MICH. L. REv. 9. See I6 Ir.r..
L. REv. 66, I9 MICH. L. REv. 648, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 3SI, 6 VA. L. Rile. n. s.
935, and 30 YALE L. J. 639. For discussions prior to the Supreme Court
decisions, see 2r Cor.u:i.r. L. REv. 394, r9 MICH. L. Ri!v. 337, 437, 5 MINN. L.
REv. 2g8, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 56, and 30 YALE L. J. Sr, g8, 99.
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Justice White referred to the failure of administrative officers and
trial courts to agree as to any standard prescribed by the act and
declared that the effect of enforcing it "would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms penalized and
punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and
unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury." Earlier cases
relied on by the government were put to one side with the statement
that, if the contention based on them were true, it would result that
"no standard whatever was required, no information as to the nature
and cause of the action was essential, and that it was competent to
delegate legislative power, in the very teeth of the settled significance of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and of other plainly
applicable provisions of the Constitution." The Chief Justice ventured the further point that in statutes previously sustained against
the charge of indefiniteness "a standard of some sort was afforded."
This decision was followed in Tedrow v. Lewis & Son, Co.,3° Kennington v. Palmer,3 1 Kt1nnane v. Detroit Creamery Co.,32 Weed &
Co. v. Lockwood,33 Willard Co. v. Palmer,34 Oglesby Grocery Co. v.
United States,3 G and Weeds Inc. v. United Sitates. 36 Only in the last
case did Justices Pitney and Brandeis think that the acts of the
defendants were within the terms of the statute. This was a conspiracy for charging excessive prices. These two justices voted to
reverse the conviction on the ground that the defendants had not
been allowed to introduce evidence as to the market value of the
goods sold, but Mr. Justice Pitney insisted that the statute was itself
constitutional, since its prohibitions referred to the natural standard
of market value, the price prevailing under current conditions of
supply and demand uninfluenced by manipulation, which was the
standard "adhered to by the common law time out of mind." 37
U. S. 98, 41 Sup. Ct. 303 ( 1921).
U. S. 100, 41 Sup. Ct. 303 ( 1921).
U. S. 102, 41 Sup. Ct. 304 (1921).
U. S. 104, 41 Sup. Ct. 305 (1921).
U. S. 106, 41 Sup. Ct. 305 ( 1921).
U.S. 108, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (19..i1).
U. S. 109, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1921).
a1 A case holding a municipal ordinance void for vagueness is treated in
21 CoLuM. L. REV'. 390; a decision permitting the jury to pass on the reasonableness of speed, in 19 MICH. L. RJ;;v. 218. For a general discussion of the
30 255
31255
3 2 255
33 255
34 255
3G 255
3 6 255
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( c) Guilty Knowledge of Defendant. A federal statute punishing the possession without lawful authority of any die in the
likeness of a die designed for producing genuine coin of the United
States was construed in Baender v. Barnett 3 s to apply only to "willing and conscious possession." While this does not mean with any
certainty that this restricted construction was essential to the constitutionality of the statute, the result was based on the canon that
a statute should be construed if possible so as to avoid "not only
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon
that score." 39

4. Right of Trial by fary
(a) Comment on Evidence. In a criminal case in the District of
Columbia in which witnesses for the prosecution and the defense
wholly agreed as to the facts, the court charged the jury that though
he could not instruct them to bring in a verdict of guilty, a failure
to do so could only arise from a flagrant disregard of the evidence,
the law, and their obligation as jurors. This was held proper in
Horning v. District of Columbia40 by a vote of five to four. Mr.
Justice McReynolds announced his dissent, and Chief Justice White
and Mr. Justice Day concurred in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis. This opinion insisted that "such a charge is a
moral command; and, being- yielded to, substitutes the will of the
judge for the conviction of the jury." For the majority Mr. Justice
Holmes conceded that "perhaps there was a regrettable peremptoriness of tone," but he added that "the jury were allowed the technical right, if it can be called so, to decide against the law and the
facts, and that is all there was left for them after the defendant
and his witnesses took the stand." His further comment that "if
the defendant suffered any wrong, it was purely formal, since, as
we have said, there was no doubt of his guilt,'' brought from Mr.
problem, see Ernst Freund, "The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes," 30
YAI.r: L. J. 437.
38 255 U. S. 224 4r Sup. Ct. 27r (r92r). See 30 YAI.E' L. J. 762.
39 Substantive elements in criminal charges are considered in Emanuel
R. Parnass, "Imprisonment for Civil Obligations in Illinois," rs ILL. L. R.Iw.
559; and a note in 5 MINN. L. R.Iw. 458 on "Contempt-Civil and Criminal."
40 254 U. S. r35, 4r Sup. Ct. 53 ( r920). See 2r CoLUM. L. Rr:v. 190, 34
HARV. L. Rr:v. 442, r9 MrcH. L. Rr:v. 325, and 6 VA. L. R.i;:G. n. s. 776.
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Justice Brandeis the retort: "Whether a defendant is found guilty
by a jury, or is declared to be so by a judge, is not, under the federal Constitution, a mere formality. * * * Congress would have been
powerless to provide for imposing the punishment except upon the
verdict of the jury. * * * I find nothing in the act to indicate that
it has sought to do so." 41
(b) Jurisdiction of Courts Martial. The requirement of the
Fifth Amendment as to presentment or indictment of a grand jury
specifically excepts "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger."
The jurisdiction of courts martial is therefore a constitutional question. Kahn v. Anderson42 held that military prisoners are subject
to trial by court martial even though the sentence being served at
the time of the second offen.se in question included dismissal from
the army. Givens v. Zerbst 43 holds that when the jurisdiction of a
court martial is attacked collaterally on habeas corpus proceedings
because the record fails to state the jurisdictionary fact that the
accused was an officer in the army, the attack may be met by evidence to show the existence of a military status of the accused.
General expressions to the contrary in prior opinions must, it was
declared, be limited in accordance with the ruling now made, since
"the complete right to collaterally assail the existence of every fact
which was essential to the exercise by such a limited court of its
authority, whether appearing on the face of the record or not, is
wholly incompatible with the conception that, when a collateral
attack is made, the face of the record is conclusive."44

5. Interstate Rendition.
In Hogan v. O'Neill45 a gentleman in cust9dy in New Jersey
under a warrant from the governor of that state in response to a
demand for rendition from the governor of Massachusetts sought
41 The requisites of procedure before the grand jury are discussed in 21
Cor.uM. L. Riw. 376; the effect of failure to administer the required oath to
the jury, in 19 MICH. L. Riw. u5.
42 255 U. S. I, 41 Sup. Ct. 224 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. Riw. 6. See 16 Ir.r..
L. Rsv. 67 and 30 Y.AI.~ L. J. 521.
43 255 U. S. II, 41 Sup. Ct. 227 (1921), 20 MICH. L. Rmt. 6.
44 The jurisdiction of courts martial is dealt with in 21 Cor.uM. L. Rsv.
38o, 34 HARV. L. REY. 659, 673, and 16 Ir.r.. L. Rsv. 56. In 5 MINN. L. Rlw.
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a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court on the ground
that he was not charged with a crime in Massachusetts and was not
a fugitive from that commonwealth. In approving of the discharge
of the writ the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Pitney pointed
out that the Massachusetts statute provided that the name of the
county and the court in the caption of an indictment should be considered an allegation that the act of the accused was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and that therefore
the failure of the indictment to specify the fact did not make it
guilty of failure to charge a crime. Failure to charge an overt act
in Massachusetts was held unimportant since the crime of conspiracy
might be committed without overt acts. On the question whether
-the relator was a fugitive from Massachusetts his own evidence
:Showed that he was within the state on or about the day charged in
· the indictment as the time when the alleged crime was committed.
Without referring to a possible question as to whether this presence
in Massachusetts was before or after the commission of the crime,
Mr. Justice Pitney declared:
"Whether in fact he was a fugitive from justice was for
the determination of the Governor of New Jersey. The warrant of arrest issued in compliance with the demand of the
Governor of Massachusetts shows that he found appellant
to be a fugitive; and this conclusion must stand unless clearly
overthrown, which appellant has not succeeded in doing. To
be regarded as a fugitive from justice it is not necessary that
one shall have left the state in which the crime is alleged to
have been committed for the very purpose of avoiding prosecution, but simply that, having committed there an act which
by the law o.f the state constitutes a crime, he afterwards has
departed from its jurisdiction and when sought to be prosecuted is found within the territory of another state."46
, Columbia University.
THOMAS REED POWELL.
(To be concluded)
540 is a note on court martial for civil offenses ; in 21 Cor,u:i.r. L. Rev. 477
a discussion of the revision of the articles of war.
45 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222 (1921).
46 The issue when an accused is a fugitive is considered in 7 VA. L. R.Ev.
150·; a case ho!ding a pardon not valid until delivered, in 34 HiARv. L. R.Ev. 678.

